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“Fishing” for Trouble?1: On the Appropriate Limits of
a Civil Investigative Demand Issued by the CFPB
I. INTRODUCTION
As its recent consent order involving Wells Fargo
demonstrates,2 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)
looms over the activities of financial institutions. Starting in 2011,3 the
agency has had a short and arguably “aggressive history.”4 In 2016,
however, the CFPB traveled a “bridge too far”5 when the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the CFPB did not
have the authority to issue a Civil Investigative Demand (“CID”) to the
Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (“ACICS”)
targeting its accrediting process.6 This ruling is notable because the
CFPB has encountered very few adverse court decisions in its brief, yet
impactful existence.7 The case presents an interesting opportunity to
examine two issues that are applicable not only to accrediting
institutions, but financial institutions as well: the appropriate scope of
the agency’s investigative authority,8 and who is the appropriate

1. See FTC v. Nat’l Claims Serv., Inc., No. S. 98-283, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3312,
at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1999) (“However, an agency may not use its subpoena power to go
on a fishing expedition.”); PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2012-MSC-PHH Corp-0001, at 5 (June
12, 2012) (petition to modify or set aside civil investigative demand) [hereinafter PHH
Petition] (citing FDIC v. Garner 126 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997).
2. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 2 (Sept. 8, 2016).
3. Lydia DePillis, A Watchdog Grows Up: The Inside Story of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 11, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/11/a-watchdog-grows-up-the-insidestory-of-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/.
4. DONALD C. LAMPE, JOE RODRIGUEZ, & AMANDA J. MOLLO, MORRISON FOERSTER,
CLIENT ALERT: CFPB SUFFERS FIRST OFFICIAL CID CHALLENGE 3 (Apr. 27, 2016), https://
media2.mofo.com/documents/160427cfpbcidchallenge.pdf.
5. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183
F. Supp. 3d 79, 83 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016).
6. Id. at 84.
7. See LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 2 (“[T]he ACICS case is significant because it
represent[ed] the first time a court has ruled against the CFPB and limited the agency’s
jurisdiction.”).
8. See LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
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recipient of a CID.9 The circumstances of this case also offer a potential
reprieve to recipients from the broad authority of the CFPB, as the
decision requires the CFPB to more narrowly define the purpose of the
investigation and places a higher burden on the CFPB to prove the
reasonableness of its belief that the entity being investigated has
information relevant to a violation when there is no “clear nexus
between the consumer financial laws it is tasked with enforcing” and the
practices they are investigating.10
This Note examines the limits on the CFPB’s authority to issue
CIDs and the potential effects on financial institutions. This Note
proceeds in five parts. Part II provides background on the CFPB, the
CID, and the recent court ruling.11 Part III examines the appropriate
scope of the CID and when it may be considered overly burdensome.12
Part IV discusses who is subject to a CID.13 Finally, Part V concludes
the analysis and looks ahead to the future of the CFPB’s investigative
authority.14
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CFPB, THE CID, AND THE DISTRICT COURT
RULING
The investigative powers of the CFPB are derived from the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”).15 According to the CFPB, Congress passed Dodd-Frank to
“protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”16 Under
Dodd-Frank, the CFPB’s remit is “to prevent a covered person or
9. See ORI LEV & STEPHEN LILLEY, MAYER BROWN, LEGAL UPDATE: SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE: THE CFPB’S NEWEST TOOL 7 (July 2016), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/
Publication/6e2a27aa-5015-4b6a-b7fb-a70461679db4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
6411b9c2-685b-438a-a83f-516c2eb083eb/160718-UPDATE-CFS.pdf (discussing the case
in the context of the CFPB’s ability “to go after parties that might otherwise escape its
reach”).
10. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. at 83 (explaining
why the CFPB was not permitted to issue the CID in this particular case).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2015).
16. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting
Council For Indep. Colls. & Schs (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 2016) No. 16-5174 [hereinafter Brief
of Petitioner] (quoting Pub. L. No. 111-23, 124 Stat. 1376. 1376 (2010)).
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service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive,
or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service,
or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.”17 Among
the consumer protection laws that the CFPB enforces are the Truth in
Lending Act (“TILA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).18 To fulfill its
purpose, the CFPB has broad enforcement powers,19 perhaps the most
useful of which is the CFPB’s investigative authority to send out
CIDs.20
A.

The Civil Investigative Demand

According to the CFPB’s director, Richard Cordray (or
“Director Cordray”), the CID is “crucial” to the CFPB’s operations.21
Broadly, a CID is a “statutorily provided discovery tool[],”
distinguishable from other discovery methods like interrogatories
because a government entity may use them to procure information from
a recipient before an official proceeding has even begun.22 Indeed, the
fact that the CFPB can issue a CID well before any formal
administrative procedure helps explain why these demands can be so
challenging for recipients to deal with.23 With the advent of the CFPB,
banking entities that had previously not been subjected to CIDs can now

17. Dodd-Frank § 1031(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a).
18. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 5 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12), (14)) (defining

“Enumerated Consumer Laws” and “Federal Consumer Financial Law” for the purposes of
the CFPB).
19. See Dodd-Frank § 1021(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(4) (defining one of the primary
functions of the agency as “supervising covered persons for compliance with Federal
consumer financial law, and taking appropriate enforcement action to address violations of
Federal consumer financial law”).
20. Dodd-Frank § 1024(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (stating that “the Bureau may,
before the institution of any proceedings under the Federal consumer financial law, issue in
writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand . . .”).
21. See PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2012-MSC-PHH Corp-0001, at 3 (Sept. 20, 2012)
[hereinafter PHH Decision and Order] (decision and order on petition to modify or set aside
civil investigative demand).
22. See John Niemann, A Closer Look at the CFPB Civil Investigative Demand, CFPB
J. (July 23, 2016), http://cfpbjournal.com/issue/cfpb-journal/article/a-closer-look-at-thecfpb-civil-investigative-demand (providing an overview of CFPB Civil Investigative
Demands).
23. Id.
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receive one from this young agency.24 Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the
CFPB may issue CIDs to anyone who may have information or
documents that pertain to a violation.25 The CID must notify the
recipient of the behavior the agency considers to be abusive or contrary
to federal consumer law.26 After a CID has been issued, the recipient is
obligated to “meet and confer” with the agency investigator either
within ten days after receiving it or before the deadline to file a petition
disputing the CID (whichever is earlier).27 The meet and confer
process, on which the CFPB places a great deal of importance when
considering modifications to the CID,28 is there so both parties can solve
issues that may arise during the process.29 This requires the recipient at
the time of the “meet and confer” with the CFPB to have all
“knowledge necessary to resolve any issues relevant to compliance with
the demand,”30 otherwise those issues are waived.31 During the
meeting, the CFPB is permitted to “negotiate and approve the terms of
satisfactory compliance with civil investigative demands and, for good
cause shown, may extend the time prescribed for compliance.”32
24. Joseph T. Lynyak, III & Rebecca Tierney, Dealing with Civil Investigative
Demands from the CFPB: Rules, Responses, and Practice Considerations, 130 BANKING
L.J. § 9.01 771–72 (2013). Prior to the existence of the CFPB, banks were under the
supervision of “federal banking agencies, which possess direct examination and supervision
authority and therefore permit the banking agencies to examine practically all books and
records of a company without the need to issue a CID.” Id. at 771.
25. Dodd-Frank § 1024(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1).
26. Dodd-Frank § 1024(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(2) (“Each civil investigative
demand shall state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under
investigation and the provision of law applicable to such violation.”).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c) (2016).
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(3) (stating that the CFPB “will not consider petitions to
set aside or modify a civil investigative demand unless the recipient has meaningfully
engaged in the meet and confer process . . .”).
29. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(1) (“The recipient must make available at the meeting
personnel with the knowledge necessary to resolve any issues relevant to compliance with
the demand.”).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(1). Examples of measures potentially needed to satisfy this
requirement include making available “individuals knowledgeable about the recipient’s
information or records management systems and/or the recipient’s organizational structure.”
Id.
31. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(3) (“The Bureau will not consider petitions to set aside
or modify a civil investigative demand unless the recipient has meaningfully engaged in the
meet and confer process . . . and will only consider issues raised during the meet and confer
process.”).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(d) (“The Assistant Director of the Office of Enforcement and
the Deputy Assistant Directors of the Office of Enforcement are authorized to negotiate and
approve the terms of satisfactory compliance with civil investigative demands and, for good
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Following the meet and confer process, if the recipient is still
unhappy with the parameters and demands of the CID, the recipient
may petition the CFPB to modify or set aside the demand within twenty
days of receipt.33 The recipient can ask for additional time to file the
petition, but is unlikely to be granted an extension.34 In its petition, the
recipient is obligated to “set forth all factual and legal objections to the
[CID], including all appropriate arguments, affidavits, and other
supporting documentation.”35 Further, the petition must certify that the
recipient had meaningfully participated in the meet and confer process
and had been unable to come to an understanding with the CFPB.36
While both Dodd-Frank itself and the CFPB’s own rules allow for CID
recipients to engage in this process,37 in practice, the chances of a CID
being set aside by the CFPB are slim.38 Pursuant to the agency’s
regulations, the CFPB director, a position endowed with broad
discretion and removable only “for cause,”39 evaluates these petitions.40
Unsurprisingly and perhaps understandably, it is unlikely that the
director would “decide to quash a CID issued by his own staff
attorneys.”41 As of February 18, 2017, Director Cordray has denied all

cause shown, may extend the time prescribed for compliance.”).
33. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1052(f)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(f)(1) (2015).
34. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(e)(2) (indicating that the CFPB may rule on extensions of time,
but also that “[r]equests for extensions of time are disfavored”)
35. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(e).
36. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(e)(1). The petition must also indicate “the date, time, and place
of each such meeting between counsel, and the names of all parties participating in each
such meeting.” Id.
37. Dodd-Frank § 1052(f), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(f); 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6.
38. See J.H. Jennifer Lee, Kaleb McNeely, & Joseph T. Lynyak, The Long Arm of the
CFPB, CORP. COUNSEL (July 2016), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202763276703/TheLong-Arm-of-the-CFPB?slreturn=20160725205011(describing how these petitions are
decided under a “low standard”).
39. See BILL MAYBERRY, JASON EVANS, JOSHUA DAVEY & ANITA FOSS,
MCGUIREWOODS, SUBJECT TO INQUIRY: D.C. CIRCUIT REBUKES CFPB IN PHH CASE
(October 11, 2016), http://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/financial-institution-regulation/d-ccircuit-rebukes-cfpb-in-phh-case/. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia recently
ruled that this unique governance structure is unconstitutional over “concern[s] about the
lack of protection against arbitrary decision-making and abuses of power by the sole
director.” Id.; see also PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6–8 (D.C.
Cir. 2016). However, the only action that the court took was to strike the provision
concerning removal from the statute. Id.
40. See MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 39 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(3)(4)).
41. Lee, et al., supra note 38.
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the petitions that he has decided.42
The difficulty of petitioning the CFPB to set aside a CID raises
the question of whether recipients should just ignore the demand.43 In
those situations, the CFPB may file an action in federal court asking for
enforcement, thus taking judgment on the CID out of the CFPB’s
hands.44 However, as Director Cordray has accurately observed, the
judiciary traditionally gives agencies a wide berth with respect to their
investigations.45 While the CFPB has relied on this deference in the
past to its benefit, the D.C. District Court’s decision in 2016 “reveal[s] a
changing tide.”46
B.

CFPB v. ACICS

On August 25, 2015, the CFPB sent a CID to ACICS.47 Its
stated purpose was to “determine whether any entity or person has
engaged or is engaging in unlawful acts and practices in connection
with accrediting for-profit colleges.”48 The demand asked the
organization to testify “regarding ACICS’s policies, procedures, and
practices relating to the accreditation of seven particular schools.”49
Further, ACICS had: “(1) to identify all post-secondary educational
institutions that ACICS had accredited since January 2010 and (2) to
identify all individuals affiliated with ACICS who conducted any
accreditation reviews since January 1, 2010 specific to twenty-one
particular schools.”50 When ACICS received the CID, it could not
come to an agreement with the CFPB regarding cooperation and thus
asked the CFPB to set aside or modify the CID.51 Director Cordray
42. See Petitions to Modify and Set Aside, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/petitions/ (last
visited Feb. 10, 2017) (displaying all petitions received from CID recipients and CFPB
responses).
43. See Lee, et al., supra note 38 (“Facing poor odds of seting aside or modifying
CIDs, recipients have also pursued the more passive strategy of simply not responding.”).
44. Lee, et al., supra note 38.
45. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4.
46. Lee, et al., supra note 38.
47. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183
F. Supp. 3d 79, 80 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016).
48. Id. at 81.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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turned down its request and instructed ACICS to engage in the meet and
confer process with the agency’s attorneys.52 When ACICS continued
to refuse to comply,53 the CFPB filed a complaint in federal court.54
In deciding the case, the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia considered “(1) whether the agency has the authority to
make the inquiry, (2) whether the information sought is reasonably
relevant, and (3) whether the demand is not too indefinite.”55 If the CID
met these requirements, it would have been enforceable unless its
stipulations were too onerous for the recipient.56 While the district court
acknowledged that courts historically have given agencies a great deal
of latitude in this area,57 Judge Leon noted that “where it is clear that an
agency either lacks the authority to investigate or is seeking information
irrelevant to a lawful investigatory purpose, a court must set such
inquiry aside.”58
In deciding that the CFPB could not issue this particular CID,59
Judge Leon focused on the language of the CID’s statement of purpose,
particularly the clause “to determine whether any entity or person has
engaged or is engaging in unlawful acts and practices in connection with
accrediting for-profit colleges, in violation of . . . [f]ederal consumer
financial protection law.”60 He acknowledged that the CFPB was aware
that “none of these [consumer financial laws] address, regulate, or even
tangentially implicate the accrediting process of for-profit colleges.”61
The court observed that the CFPB “realiz[ed] the absence of a clear
nexus between the consumer financial laws it is tasked with enforcing
and its purported investigation into accreditation of for-profit
schools.”62 Instead, the CFPB contended that since it could certainly
investigate the activities of for-profit schools, it was also permitted to

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977); CFTC v. Ekasala, 62 F. Supp. 3d 88, 93
(D.D.C. 2014)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 81–82.
58. Id. at 82.
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis original).
61. Id. at 83.
62. Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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examine an organization’s activities that could be tied to that potentially
illicit conduct.63 It was “this post-hoc justification” that the court
considered to be “a bridge too far!”64 The court rejected the CFPB’s
argument that it had the right to investigate its relationship with the
schools, even when ACICS had offered a description of its organization
that did not support a potential connection with violations of consumer
laws.65 The court concluded that “[a]lthough it is understandable that
new agencies like the CFPB will struggle to establish the exact
parameters of their authority, they must be especially prudent before
choosing to plow head long into fields not clearly ceded to them by
Congress.”66
III. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF A CID
Perhaps the most crucial issue that the court touched on is the
appropriate scope of a CID issued by the CFPB. Put another way, may
the CFPB use its investigative authority to go on “fishing expeditions”
on the basis of nothing more than mere optimism that its search will
reveal violations of federal consumer laws?67
A.

The Stated Purpose of the CID

As mentioned earlier, issues regarding the scope of CIDs can be
traced to the fact that these demands are issued prior to the start of any
official proceeding.68 In the CFPB’s first decision regarding a petition
to modify or set aside a CID,69 Director Cordray asserted that although

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84.
See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 5 (citing FDIC v. Garner 126 F.3d 1138, 1146
(9th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Nat’l Claims Serv., Inc., No. S. 98-283, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3312, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1999)).
68. John Niemann, A Closer Look at the CFPB Civil Investigative Demand, CFPB J.
(July 23, 2016), http://cfpbjournal.com/issue/cfpb-journal/article/a-closer-look-at-the-cfpbcivil-investigative-demand (providing an overview of CFPB Civil Investigative Demands).
69. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21 (decision and order on petition to
modify or set aside civil investigative demand). Being the first decision, Director Cordray
took note of its “precedential value” and spent no small amount of time trying “to provide
more specific guidance for parties assessing their course of conduct in similar
circumstances . . . .” PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 1.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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the agency may gather enough information from publicly available
sources to issue a CID,70 there is usually “a substantial information gap”
between the agency and the target at that initial phase.71 With this in
mind, the director stated that the purpose of the CID is to close this gap
between the CFPB and the recipient so the agency can decide whether
or not to investigate the recipient in more detail.72 Director Cordray
suggested that this can also work in favor of the recipient, as it may lead
to more expeditious resolution of the matter if it turns out that there was
no violation.73 However, the director emphasized that at the early
stages, the agency is required to broaden the scope of its CIDs in order
to adequately familiarize itself with the situation.74 Director Cordray
adopted a deferential standard of review for petitions to set aside
CIDs,75 and asserted that the CFPB “can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not.”76 Under this interpretation, no CID issued by
the CFPB could be considered overly broad as a wide net will either
catch some form of unlawful activity or enable the agency to be

70. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. Specifically, Cordray determined
that these public sources like news stories and consumer complaints would give the agency
“reason to believe that ‘a[] person may be in possession, custody or control’ of documents,
items or information ‘relevant to a violation’ of federal consumer financial law.” Id.
(quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1052(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (2015)).
71. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3.
72. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3.
73. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. The director also noted that “if the
result of the CID process is to substantiate a likely violation of law, then unless the subject
desires to adopt a “scorched earth” policy of delay and obfuscation, once again the closing
of the information gap between the parties is likely to lead to a more sensible resolution of
the matter with less accompanying time and expense.” PHH Decision and Order, supra note
21, at 3.
74. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3.
75. The standard used by the CFPB in these matters is slightly different from what the
D.C. Circuit used in ACICS. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4. The standard
that the agency uses will reject a petition to set aside a CID if “(1) the investigation is for a
lawfully authorized purpose; (2) the information requested is relevant to the investigation;
and (3) procedural requirements are followed.” PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at
4. If the director is satisfied that those three criteria have been met, he will reject the
petition “unless the subject demonstrates the CID imposes an ‘undue burden’ or constitutes
an abuse of the court’s process.” PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4. Notably,
the third factor used by the CFPB differs from the factor used by Judge Leon, which
requires that “the demand [be] not too indefinite.” See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d 79, 81 (D.D.C. Apr. 21,
2016).
76. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4.
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satisfied that the recipient is conducting itself appropriately.77 In this
way, the petition process that Congress specifically provided for in
Dodd-Frank is rendered essentially meaningless.78
Director Cordray made this argument—that the CFPB could
initiate an investigation simply for “assurance”—in response to a
petition made by PHH Corporation, a financial services company that
provides mortgage services to other firms.79 Much of PHH’s argument
in its petition focused on the broad scope of the issued CID.80 It first
contended that the CID did not give PHH adequate notice.81 It argued
that unless the conduct leading to the alleged violation is clearly
identified, the recipient will not be able to meet the obligations of the
demand or compose a coherent challenge to the aspects of the demand
that serve no readily ascertainable purpose.82 As the scope of the
investigation targeted the mortgage lending process generally, PHH
contended that the CID’s stated purpose did not “state the nature of the
conduct” that was under investigation and therefore did not comply with
the stipulations of the statute.83 Second, PHH argued that the CFPB
could not use its investigative authority “to go on fishing expeditions.”84
The CID asked for all relevant documents pertaining to PHH’s captive
reinsurance business, which PHH believed was “equivalent to an open

See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4–5.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1052(f), 12
U.S.C. § 5562(f) (2015) (outlining the CID petition process).
79. PHH Petition, supra note 1. On June 12, 2012, PHH Corporation, filed a petition
to modify or set aside a CID issued by the CFPB. PHH Petition, supra note 1. Earlier that
year, the CFPB disclosed to PHH that it was investigating whether the corporation’s
practices had violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. PHH Decision and Order,
supra note 21, at 4–5. In May of that year, the CFPB requested answers via a CID to twentyone interrogatories and thirty-three document requests. PHH Decision and Order, supra note
21, at 2. PHH would also play an important role in the CFPB’s evolution several years later.
MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 39; PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6–
8 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
80. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 1–2, 5–8 (June 12, 2012). The CID claimed that its
purpose was “to determine whether mortgage lenders and private mortgage insurance
providers or other unnamed persons have engaged in, or are engaging in, unlawful acts or
practices in connection with residential mortgage loans . . . .” PHH Petition, supra note 1, at
2.
81. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 1.
82. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 2.
83. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 2.
84. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 5 (citing FDIC v. Garner, 126 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1997); FTC v. Nat’l Claims Serv., Inc., No. S 98-283, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3312, at *2
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1999)).
77.
78.
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records search of all business conducted by PHH over the last eleven
be
years.”85 It further asserted that the CFPB’s request must
appropriately tailored to target specific conduct.86 Instead, the CFPB
asked for more than a decade’s worth of records based on a hunch that a
violation would turn up, according to PHH.87
ACICS similarly disputed the scope of the CID.88 It argued that
the requirement of 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c), that the CID identify the
violating conduct, “is vital to the respondent’s ability to understand and
respond to the CID, as well as to formulate objections to the same.”89
ACICS claimed that the statement of purpose was far too amorphous to
comply with, and in fact applied not only to ACICS, but “every
accrediting agency, for-profit school and student(s) therein.”90 ACICS
echoed this argument in court, stating that under the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010 (“CFPA”), “[t]he Bureau can only
propound a CID that seeks information that is relevant to conduct that
could be actionable under a law that the Bureau enforces.”91 Thus,
ACICS contended that the CFPB was ignoring limits that Congress had
expressly placed on the agency.92
The CFPB denied both PHH’s and ACICS’s arguments on
similar grounds.93 Director Cordray rejected PHH’s argument that the

PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 7–8.
PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8 (citing U.S. v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73
F.3d 464, 471 (2nd Cir. 1996); FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089
(D.C. Cir. 1992); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
87. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8 (citing U.S. v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73
F.3d 464, 471 (2nd Cir. 1996); FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089
(D.C. Cir. 1992); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
88. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 10–11; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. and
Schs.’s Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs, 183 F. Supp.
3d 79 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016) (No. 1:15-CV-01838-RJL) 9 [hereinafter Opposition to the
CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand].
89. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., CFPB No. 2015-MISC-ACICS0001, at 10 (Sept. 14, 2015) (petition to modify or set aside civil investigative demand).
90. Id. at 10–11.
91. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 10.
92. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 10.
93. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 1; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls.
& Schs., CFPB No. 2015-MISC-ACICS-0001, at 1 (Oct. 8, 2015) (decision and order on
petition to modify or set aside civil investigative demand) [hereinafter ACICS Decision and
Order].
85.
86.
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CID did not clearly identify the investigation’s purpose,94 arguing that
the CID’s intent can be demarcated “quite generally.”95 Director
Cordray also argued that the inquiry was appropriately and reasonably
directed to aspects of the corporation “involved in the narrower function
of selecting where to direct the company’s mortgage insurance
business.”96 According to Director Cordray, “[t]he Bureau has ample
reason to believe that its inquiries are relevant to the ongoing
investigation, and the courts presume the relevance and appropriateness
of the CID unless the requests are ‘obviously wrong.’”97 With respect
to ACICS’s petition, the CFPB relied on its own precedent established
over the past few years to conclude that the disputed statement of
purpose was “functionally equivalent” to those the agency had already
determined “satisfied the requirements of the statute and regulations.”98
Further, the agency emphasized that “a detailed narrative” was not
necessary to satisfy the demands of the statute.99 Similar to his
reasoning in the PHH decision, Director Cordray stated that “the
purpose of an investigation is ‘to discover and procure evidence, not to
prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon which to make one if, in
the [Bureau’s] judgment, the facts thus discovered should justify doing
so.’”100 Thus, according to the CFPB, ACICS had no defense to a CID
because the CID will either justify its issuance by finding unlawful
behavior, or will only prove its irrelevance after it has already been
complied with.101
In response to the CFPB’s similar arguments in district court,
Judge Leon had a one word response: “Please.”102 Focusing on the
CID’s statement of purpose, the court concluded that the CID “said
nothing about an investigation into the lending or financial advisory
practices of for-profit schools.”103 Instead, the court noted that the
PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 5.
PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6 (quoting FTC v. O’Connell
Associates, Inc. 828 F. Supp. 165, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
96. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 5.
97. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 7.
98. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3.
99. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3.
100. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3.
101. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 2–3.
102. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183
F.Supp. 3d 79, 83 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016).
103. Id.
94.
95.
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language of the statement of purpose (as well as the CID’s specific
requests) demonstrated the CFPB’s intent to “target[] the accreditation
process generally.”104 Additionally, Judge Leon dismissed as a “posthoc justification” the CFPB’s argument that it was permitted to
investigate ACICS’s assertions of fact and evaluate whether or not they
were to its liking.105 Although the court did not explicitly reject the
CFPB’s general belief that it is entitled to investigate entities simply
because it wants assurance that federal consumer laws are being
complied with, the implication of the court’s holding is that some limit
exists to the CFPB’s ability to bootstrap its way into an investigation.106
However, the court’s explicit holding in ACICS is fairly narrow.107
Judge Leon did not make any sweeping declarations of law regarding
the limits of the CFPB’s investigative authority, but limited the
holding to the very fact specific nature of this case, simply
concluding that the CFPB could not investigate the accreditation
process.108 Indeed, this has led some commentators to believe that
“Judge Leon may have provided the Bureau with an alternative
remedy.”109 The court seemed to hint at the possibility that the CFPB
could investigate ACICS’s connection with for-profit schools and those
institutions’ potentially illicit conduct if the agency had only composed
the CID appropriately.110 The court may simply have encouraged the
CFPB to “consider revising the CID, and its stated purpose, to a more
narrowly tailored inquiry into those potential connections.”111
However, rather than an oversight, this may have been the point. As
PHH had previously advocated, the 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c) requirement
can be reasonably interpreted as being intended to both increase the
likelihood that a recipient will fully comply with the agency’s directives
and to also permit a recipient to mount a coherent challenge to the
CID’s request.112 By requiring the CFPB to narrow and specify the

Id. at 84.
Id. at 83.
Id.
See id. at 84.
Id.
LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs.,
183 F. Supp. 3d 79, 83 – 84 (D.D.C. 2016).
111. LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
112. See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 2.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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purpose of the CID,113 the court gave recipients a much better chance to
prepare themselves for a more meaningful meet and confer process
where both parties can actually “resolve all issues regarding
compliance.”114 Indeed, the court’s “limitation” on the CFPB’s
investigatory authority may actually be to the agency’s benefit because
a specific inquiry can aid the recipient in responding to the CID more
effectively than a request for a broad survey of the recipient’s activities
can.115 It may also help the CFPB avoid situations where the recipient,
while trying to decipher what conduct the CFPB is actually targeting,
engages in a “policy of delay and obfuscation.”116
B.

Undue Burden

Another relevant facet in analyzing the appropriate scope of a
CID is the degree of the burden imposed on the recipient.117 Both the
CFPB and the district court used a framework that would refuse to
enforce a CID if it would constitute an undue burden even if all other
criteria had been met.118 Proving that a CID is an undue burden has
historically been a challenge, however.119 Generally, an administrative
subpoena like a CID will only “be deemed unduly burdensome if
compliance threatens to unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal
operations of a business.”120
Some practitioners have commented that the CID timeline and
process pose various difficulties for a recipient.121 It is not clear,
113. See LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
114. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c) (2016).
115. See PHH Petition, supra note 1 at 2 (June 12, 2012) (The “explicit statutory

requirement is crucial to the recipient’s ability to understand and respond to the CID, as well
as to formulate appropriate objections and to challenge the overbroad aspects of the CID.”).
116. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3.
117. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183
F. Supp. 3d 79, 81 (D.D.C. 2016).
118. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 5; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls.
& Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 81.
119. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)) (noting that “the courts place a significant legal burden
on the party challenging a CID or administrative subpoena on these grounds”).
120. FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
121. See, e.g., Dylan W. Howard, The CFPB’s Uncivil Civil Investigative Demands,
LAW 360 (Nov. 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/599019/the-cfpb-s-uncivil-civilinvestigative-demands (discussing the challenges of meeting the requirements for a CID
issued by the CFPB).
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however, that the timeline demands of the CFPB’s CID differ all that
much from other federal agencies.122 When the agency designed its
rules, it drew from existing agency regulations, especially the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”).123 For example, while the FTC does
provide four more days for the recipient to fulfill the meet and confer
process,124 recipients of a CID from the FTC receive the same amount
of time to petition a demand.125 Also, the FTC similarly states that it
will refuse to “consider petitions to quash or limit absent a pre-filing
meet and confer session with Commission staff and, absent
extraordinary circumstances, will consider only issues raised during the
meet and confer process.”126 Some practitioners have argued that while
these two agencies have similar rules as written, the “family
resemblance stops on paper in many areas.”127 While the FTC and the
CFPB have similar “meet and confer” rules, the FTC “rarely held to a
hard and fast meeting within this meet and confer deadline.”128
Meanwhile, the CFPB “will come expecting a substantive, detailed
discussion about concerns regarding process and scope as well as
detailed information on the nature and location of the materials sought,”
which is another departure from the FTC.129 With such strict adherence
to the letter of the rules, it is perhaps no surprise that PHH and ACICS
could not successfully challenge the CFPB on these grounds.130
Aside from the onerous processes a recipient can encounter in
responding to a CID, there is also the potential burden that comes from
seeking to challenge a CID.131 While the CFPB considers its
122. See e.g., 12 C.F.R § 1080.1 (2016) (governing the FTC investigative processes); 16
C.F.R. pt. 3; 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 et seq. (2016) (governing the SEC investigative processes).
123. Jonice Gray Tucker & Amanda Raines, CFPB Investigations in Focus: Navigating
CIDs, LAW 360 (July 11, 2013, 12:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/455982/cfpbinvestigations-in-focus-navigating-cids.
124. 16 C.F.R. § 2.7(k) (2016) (“[A] recipient of Commission compulsory process shall
meet and confer with Commission staff within 14 days after receipt of process or before the
deadline for filing a petition to quash . . . .”).
125. Federal Trade Commission Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(f)(1) (2015) (stating that
the recipient of civil investigative demand from the Commission must file a petition “no[]
later than 20 days after the service of any civil investigative demand . . .”).
126. 16 C.F.R. § 2.7(k) (2016).
127. See Tucker & Raines, supra note 123.
128. Tucker & Raines, supra note 123.
129. Tucker & Raines, supra note 123.
130. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6; Brief of Petitioner, supra note
16, at 29.
131. See TED KORNOBIS & STEPHANIE C. ROBINSON, K&L GATES: LEGAL INSIGHT: D.C.
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investigations to be “non-public, the CFPB has taken the position that
petitions to set aside a CID are public proceedings and, absent
extraordinary circumstances, it will post a company’s petition on its
website shortly after the petition is filed.”132 In a recent decision,133 the
D.C. District Court noted how the announcement of an investigation
might inflict both reputational and financial harm to the recipient, even
before the CFPB might find anything wrong.134 In a decision arising
out of the same matter,135 a former corporate officer of a recipient
contended that as the entity required “access to hundreds of millions of
dollars in capital from banks and private investors,”136 public disclosure
of the CFPB investigation could lead these lenders to “withdraw their
capital access and invest elsewhere.”137 The D.C. District Court did
leave open the option for recipients of CIDs to ask for confidentiality
while they ask the CFPB to set aside the investigative instrument, but
these cases help demonstrate how a broad CID can potentially have
substantial ramifications.138
Finally, as the United States Chamber of Commerce argued in
its amicus brief in support of ACICS, the CFPB’s arguable infringement
into another agency’s domain (in this case, the Department of
Education’s domain) can lead to regulatory uncertainty.139 If it is
DISTRICT COURT DECISION SUPPORTS PRINCIPLE ALLOWING COMPANIES TO CHALLENGE
CFPB INFORMATION REQUESTS WITHOUT FEAR OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INVESTIGATION 1
(2015), http://www.klgates.com/dc-district-court-decision-supports-principle-of-allowingcompanies-to-challenge-cfpb-information-requests-without-fear-of-public-disclosure-ofinvestigation-11-05-20152/.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Plaintiff v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141812 (D.D.C.
Oct. 16, 2015). The plaintiffs in the case were entities who provided consumer credit
counseling. Id. at *1. They had sought an injunctive order that would prevent the CFPB
from proceeding with a deposition-type hearing after the agency had denied the plaintiff’s
counsel to be present at the hearing. Id. at *2–3. The court concluded by “decid[ing] to
unseal the case, but redact the names of the parties involved.” KORNOBIS & ROBINSON,
supra note 131, at 4.
134. KORNOBIS & ROBINSON, supra note 131, at 4. In contrast, the CFPB had
“dismissed identical claims as ‘remote’ and stated that ‘the mere fact that [an entity] would
suffer embarrassment as a result of [its] associations with law enforcement investigations is
not the type of ‘harm’ that justifies confidentiality.” KORNOBIS & ROBINSON, supa note 131,
at 4.
135. John Doe Co. No. 1 v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78988
(D.D.C. June 15, 2016).
136. Id. at *27 (internal quotations omitted).
137. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
138. See KORNOBIS & ROBINSON, supra note 131, at 5.
139. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
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unclear who the regulator is or how many regulators there may be for a
certain activity, an entity may seek to evade regulation altogether by
“tightening product availability, eliminating features, or exiting
particular product categories.”140 Although the possibility that the
CFPB is going beyond its statutory boundaries is troubling in and of
itself and will be discussed further, issuing CIDs in these circumstances
also can compel entities to alter their compliance policies,141 and may
even lead “to higher prices for consumers and reduced choice in
consumer financial products.”142 Banks may be among the most
vulnerable to this burden as it was far less common for them to receive
CIDs prior to Dodd-Frank.143
Both PHH and ACICS argued that the CID imposed an undue
burden on their businesses.144 PHH alleged that the CID required
review of any document that “touches on the issue of private mortgage
insurance” and would compel the company to incur substantial expenses
in responding to the agency’s request.145 Further, PHH noted that it had
offered to turn over a significant number of documents that were
already available and to cooperate with the CFPB if the agency deemed
that additional documents were relevant.146 Because the CFPB did not
grant PHH’s request “to both produce materials and preserve its
objections,”147 PHH argued that it had been forced into “the untenable
position of either filing its petition by June 12, 2012, or waiving its
objections.”148 It concluded that the investigative demand should be
more narrowly tailored to reduce its negative impact on the recipient’s
operations.149
ACICS similarly argued that the CID was unreasonably
Supporting Respondent at 16–18, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for
Indep. Colls. and Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d. (2016) (No. 6-5174).
140. Id. at 17 (citing AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. at 17.
143. See Lynyak & Tierney, supra note 24, at 771–72.
144. PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2012-MSC-PHH Corp-0001, at 8 (June 12, 2012) (petition
to modify or set aside civil investigative demand); Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to
Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra note 88, at 7.
145. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8.
146. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 9.
147. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 9.
148. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 9.
149. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 10 (citing U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35–36 (D.C. 2005)).
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burdensome, stating that “the CID imposes a burden on ACICS that
extends well beyond the financial impact and time commitment of
responding to the broad information request.”150 It illustrated how the
CID requested the names of “volunteer evaluators who serve in an
academic capacity at a peer institution or other institution of higher
education, including instructors, professors and adjunct professors who
have ‘day jobs,’ but volunteer their time for the accrediting process.”151
ACICS argued that enforcement of the CID would have a chilling effect
on those who would otherwise choose to volunteer their time.152 The
council even went as far as to assert that “some evaluators have
expressed their intention to no longer participate in the accrediting
review process.”153
The CFPB rejected both of these arguments.154 Director
Cordray argued that PHH “offered little to no detail to make the kind of
showing required to substantiate these claims.”155 As a general rule, the
CFPB requires that “in order to meet its legal burden, the subject must
undertake a good-faith effort to show ‘the exact nature and extent of the
hardship’ imposed and state specifically how compliance will harm its
business.”156 Director Cordray concluded that PHH had not met its
burden here, claiming that it had offered only generalized grievances in
support of its claim.157 With respect to ACICS’s argument, the CFPB in
its brief dismissed it as “speculation.”158 The CFPB contended that the
ACICS’s argument concerning the potential chilling effect of the CID
on the evaluator pool did not “suggest[] that compliance with the CID
would ‘unduly disrupt’ or ‘seriously hinder’ ACICS’s normal business

150. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 16.
151. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 16–17.
152. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 17.
153. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 17.
154. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6; Brief of Petitioner, supra note
16, at 29.
155. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6.
156. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6. (quoting FTC v. Markin, 391 F.
Supp. 865, 870–71 (W.D. Mich. 1974), aff’d, 532 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1976)).
157. PHH Decision and Order supra note 21, at 6.
158. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 29.
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operations.”159
The court in ACICS had the opportunity to comment on whether
or not the CID in question was overly burdensome, but declined to do
so.160 While Judge Leon mentioned that the CFPB was requesting “a
list of all individuals involved in the accreditation of twenty-one
enumerated schools,”161 he did so to emphasize that this was something
that the CFPB was not “empowered to do” and not to comment on the
potential strain put on ACICS.162 Judge Leon may have sidestepped the
“undue burden” issue because of potential doubts about ACICS’s
argument that the CID’s chilling effect on the future participation was
actually an undue burden,163 or simply because he wanted to focus on
the CFPB’s authority in this case rather than analyze whether this
particular CID was “unduly burdensome.”164 However, limiting the
overall scope of a CID may lift the burden on institutions when they
comply with the demand.165 A broader CID will almost certainly be
more demanding on a recipient.166 For instance, PHH asserted that the
CFPB’s “fishing expedition” would “require the production of
voluminous amounts of irrelevant material, and will require PHH to
conduct an unreasonable search of all PHH facilities.”167 Under the
court’s holding, recipients of a CID should have more success
contesting the latitude of a CID’s purpose rather than speculating on the
potential disruptions to its business.168

Id.
See generally, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls.
& Schs, 183 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2016).
161. Id. at 83–84.
162. Id.
163. See Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand,
supra note 88, at 17.
164. Since the legal standard used by the court only considers the burden of the CID if
the three initial requirements are met, the court may have considered it unnecessary to
address the burden on ACICS since it had already found that the CFPB did not “have the
statutory authority to issue the CID in question . . . .” Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls.
& Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
165. See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8.
166. See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8.
167. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8.
168. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 84 (ruling
that the CFPB overstepped its authority by issuing the CID, but choosing not to conduct an
analysis of the burden that the CID would impose on ACICS).
159.
160.
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IV. WHO IS THE APPROPRIATE RECIPIENT OF A CID?
The ACICS decision also offered an opportunity to look at who
the appropriate subject of a CID is.169 As discussed earlier, the
language under Dodd-Frank is broad, permitting the CFPB to issue the
investigative instrument when the agency believes that an entity
possesses information that relates to a violation of consumer laws.170
Indeed, this language suggests that the investigative authority of the
CFPB is far broader than its enforcement authority under the CFPA,
which concerns “covered persons”171 as well as those who “provide
substantial assistance” to a covered person.172
“Substantial assistance” is an “enforcement tool” that the CFPB
has been using with increasing regularity.173 The provision has broad
implications as “it applies to ‘any person;’ it applies ‘notwithstanding
any provision of this title;’ and it allows imposition of liability
equivalent to that imposed on the recipient of the assistance.”174 While
it is tempting to conclude that the CFPB will use “substantial
assistance” only in scenarios where it seeks to go after companies that
“do not themselves qualify as covered persons or service providers”
(like ACICS), financial institutions should be aware of their potential
liability under this provision.175 First, the agency can use “substantial
assistance . . . as one of multiple bases asserting jurisdiction in an
enforcement action.”176 For instance, in a consent order issued to
Citibank N.A. the CFPB claimed that Citibank had committed a
violation not only because it had “engaged in unfair acts and practices,”
See id. at 82–83.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1052(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (2015).
171. Dodd-Frank § 1002(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (defining a covered person as “any
person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service”).
172. Dodd-Frank § 1036,12 U.S.C. § 5536 (stating that it is unlawful for “any person to
knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assistance to a covered person or service
provider in violation of the provisions of section 1031, or any rule or order issued
thereunder, and notwithstanding any provision of this title, the provider of such substantial
assistance shall be deemed to be in violation of that section to the same extent as the person
to whom such assistance is provided”).
173. See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6.
174. LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 2. For reasons that will become significant later,
the “any person” coverage has been deemed to apply “generically.” See Lee, et al., supra
note 38.
175. See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6.
176. See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6.
169.
170.
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but because it had “provided substantial assistance to covered persons
engaged in deceptive acts or practices by overstating the annual
percentage rate (APR) for accounts in Sales Files . . . [that] it provided
to debt buyers.”177 Therefore, in certain situations, the CFPB can use
“substantial assistance” as an additional jurisdictional hook even when
an entity is already covered.178
More significantly, however, the CFPB has attempted to use the
“substantial assistance” provision to target entities that are not normally
under its purview.179 The ACICS case is a prime example as the
accreditation of for-profit schools is “not a financial product or
service.”180 Instead, “[t]o get over this hurdle, the CFPB sought to
assert that by accrediting for-profit schools, the accrediting body was
providing substantial assistance to potential UDAAPs181 committed by
those schools in connection with private student loans.”182 In court, the
CFPB contended that it was well within its authority to issue the CID
because it “is empowered to take action” under the substantial
assistance provision.183 As Director Cordray commented, “‘[i]f an
accrediting agency is facilitating for-profit colleges’ misleading
consumers, treating them unfairly and deceptively, then that’s
something we should look at.’”184
In response to the CFPB’s allegations, ACICS argued that it
“does not offer any assistance in the area of student finance to its
accredited institutions, let alone substantial assistance.”185 It denied any
participation in “any . . . financial arrangement between its accredited
institutions and students.”186 ACICS also rejected the notion that the

Consent Order at 1, Citibank N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-003 (Feb. 23, 2016).
See id.
See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6.
See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6.
Unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1031(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2015).
182. LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6.
183. LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 7.
184. LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 7 (citing Michael Statford, CFPB Chief Defends
Investigation Involving College Accreditation, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 29, 2015), https://
www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/10/29/cfpb-chief-defends-investigationinvolving-college-accreditation).
185. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 14.
186. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 14.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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CFPB had made a showing that “ACICS ‘in some sort associated [itself]
with the venture, . . . that [it] sought by [its] action to make it
succeed.’”187 Furthermore, ACICS claimed that its status as a nonprofit eliminated any potential “economic motivation to assist for-profit
schools in alleged deceptive practices that in turn lead to students taking
out private loans to attend for-profit colleges.”188 In addition, because
ACICS did not make or fund student loans, it argued that “it cannot be
said that the alleged practice of deceiving students into taking out
private loans is the ‘direct or foreseeable result of ACICS’s
accreditation process.’”189 In conclusion, ACICS argued that the CFPB
alleged conduct “that could never be actionable under any consumer
financial law, including the Bureau’s UDAAP authority.”190
While the term “substantial assistance” is notably absent from
Judge Leon’s ruling, the opinion does address the issue.191 The court
acknowledged that the investigation of “the lending practices of forprofit schools” was a legitimate aim for the CFPB.192 Thus, if ACICS
was “knowingly or recklessly provid[ing] substantial assistance to”
these for-profit schools and their potentially illegal lending practices, it
would in theory fall under the CFPB’s jurisdiction.193 However, the
CFPB’s argument failed for two reasons.194 First, as discussed above,
the scope of the CID was far too broad.195 The demand in question
concerned the general process of “accrediting for-profit colleges”196 and
did not contain an allegation that ACICS was aiding these schools in the

187. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 14 (citing S.E.C. v. Grendys, 840 F. Supp. 2d 36, 46 (D.D.C. 2012)).
188. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 14.
189. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 15.
190. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra
note 88, at 10–11.
191. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183
F. Supp. 3d 79, 82–84 (D.D.C. 2016).
192. Id. at 84 n.4. Indeed, the court specifically indicated that it was aware that the
investigation of “for-profit schools for suspected violations of the consumer financial laws
in connection with their lending and financial-advisory services” was ongoing. Id. at 84.
193. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
2010(a)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(3) (2015).
194. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 84 n.4.
195. Id. at 82.
196. Id. at 81.
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violation of consumer protection laws.197 Even more broadly, the CID
“sa[id] nothing about an investigation into the lending or financialadvisory practices of for-profit schools.”198 The CFPB mentioned its
investigation of for-profit schools in federal court,199 but this
justification was not included in its investigative purpose,200 or in its
decision to deny ACICS’s petition.201 Second, it appears that Judge
Leon accepted ACICS’s argument that the facts did not support a
plausible allegation of substantial assistance.202 The court agreed with
ACICS’s assertion that “the accreditation process simply has no
connection to a school’s private student lending practices.”203 Further,
Judge Leon pointed out that “ACICS is not involved in the financial aid
decisions of the schools it accredits, which means it plays no part in
deciding whether to make or fund a student loan.”204 Thus, the absence
of any explicit reference to substantial assistance in the opinion is
logical, because the CFPB itself did not invoke the term in its CID205
and the CFPB could not point to actions taken by ACICS that could
qualify as substantial assistance.206
The court’s discussion of the “absence of a clear nexus”
between the consumer financial laws under the care of the CFPB and
the accreditation of for-profit schools begs the question:207 should the
CFPB’s investigative authority with respect to facilitators be on par
with its authority to investigate violators themselves?208 One
interpretation of ACICS’s holding is that since the accreditation of
schools is not within the purview of the CFPB, the agency was not
See id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
See Memorandum in Support of Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand at
5, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F.
Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-5174).
200. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 83.
201. See ACICS Decision and Order, supra note 93, at 3.
202. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs, 183 F. Supp. 3d at 84 (stating
that “the investigation target[ed] the accreditation process generally”).
203. Id. at 83.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 82.
206. Id. (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 1052(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(2) (2015)) (“These CIDs must ‘state the
nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under investigation and the
provision of law applicable to such violations.’”).
207. Id. at 83.
208. Lee, et al., supra note 38.
197.
198.
199.
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permitted to investigate the process under the substantial assistance
provision on these facts.209 While the D.C. Circuit may shortly offer
additional guidance, the district court’s holding implicitly proposes a
sliding scale of judicial deference that skillfully balances both the
agency’s interest in locating and finding violators and the CID
recipient’s interest in avoiding unreasonable “fishing expeditions.”210
Under this sliding scale, the judiciary’s deference to the CFPB will be at
its greatest when there is “a clear nexus” between the CFPB’s mandate
and the recipient;211 in other words, when the CFPB attempts to
investigate potential violations of a “covered person” and the service it
is offering to the public.212 When, however, the CFPB purports to
investigate an entity not for its own product or practices, but because the
CFPB is arguing that the entity is aiding another person in violating
consumer laws, a court would require the CFPB to make more of a
prima facie case that it actually “has reason to believe” the recipient has
information “relevant to a violation.”213 Under this standard, it would
be more difficult for the CFPB to initiate an investigation when the
recipient of the CID has a tenuous relationship to consumer financial
protection laws and has made a coherent, “fact-based argument” that the
recipient is either not under the jurisdiction of the CFPB or has not
violated one of the laws that the CFPB is mandated to enforce.214

See id.
PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 5 (citing FDIC v. Garner 126 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1997); FTC v. Nat’l Claims Serv., Inc., No. S. 98-283, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3312, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1999)).
211. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 83
(suggesting that since there was not a “clear nexus” here, the CFPB was not entitled to issue
a CID and investigate for itself whether ACICS’s characterization of the accreditation
process, which the court deemed accurate, was satisfactory or not).
212. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1002(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2015) (defining a covered person as “any person that engages
in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service.”).
213. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 83 (“[T]he
accreditation process simply has no connection to a school’s private student lending
practices.”).
214. ACICS Decision and Order, supra note 93, at 2; see also Lee et. al., supra note 38
(suggesting that “these issues also hinge[] on whether courts will recognize that a distinct
policy exists—given the specific Dodd-Frank limitation to enforce consumer protection
laws against ‘covered persons’—to distinguish CIDs from the administrative subpoenas of
other agencies (like the SEC and FTC), thereby warranting a higher standard for the CFPB
than otherwise exists for federal agencies”).
209.
210.
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V. CONCLUSION
As mentioned earlier, the ACICS case was the first time that the
judiciary had stood in the way of the CFPB’s authority.215 In a sense, a
result such as this one should offer encouragement to financial
institutions.216 Moreover, the result may lead more entities to challenge
CIDs issued by the CFPB.217 The long term practical effects of the
ruling, however, remain to be seen.218 In response to the decision, the
CFPB has elected to appeal to the D.C. Circuit,219 with both parties
reiterating their positions in oral argument in early February.220 Thus,
more clarification on the scope of the CFPB’s investigative authority
should be on the way.221 In the meantime, the CFPB has continued
filing CID enforcement actions in federal court against entities disputing
the agency’s jurisdiction.222 2017 will thus be a momentous year not
only with respect to the agency’s investigative powers, but also in other
areas as well.223
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Although the CFPB’s process may not be more onerous than
investigative processes at other federal agencies,224 complying with a
CID issued by the CFPB is still “a tall order for any organization.”225
Pursuant to its own precedent, the CFPB can use a CID to initiate a
broad-ranging investigation226 and can do so without “a detailed
narrative” delineating the violating conduct.227 The potential burden on
financial institutions is exacerbated by the CFPB’s increasingly frequent
use of the substantial assistance tool, which not only expands the
purview of the agency’s authority,228 but also can serve as an additional
basis of jurisdiction for entities already covered under the statute.229
Finally, the CFPB has rejected each recipient’s attempt to set aside a
CID,230 due at least in part to its broad interpretation of the judiciary’s
typical deference toward administrative subpoenas.231 The ACICS
decision, however, demonstrates that judicial review does have some
“bite” when it comes to reviewing the CFPB’s investigations,232 and
more importantly, offered two solutions to these issues.233 By honing in
on the language of the CID’s statement of purpose, the court was able to
distinguish the agency’s internal analysis from its own review,234 and
offered the CFPB an opportunity to narrowly tailor its investigation

protection-bureau-republicans.html?_r=0. Curbing the agency’s powers in such a manner
would also presumably minimize the permitted scope of a CID, as the plans include
“blocking it from being able to go after businesses engaged in deceptive practices and
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Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 C.F.R. § 3.1-3.40; SEC Rules of Practice, 17
C.F.R. § 201.100-201.900, with Jonice Gray Tucker & Amanda Raines, CFPB
Investigations in Focus: Navigating CIDs, LAW 360 (July 11, 2013), https://
www.law360.com/articles/455982/cfpb-investigations-in-focus-navigating-cids.
225. Dylan W. Howard, The CFPB’s Uncivil Civil Investigative Demands, LAW 360
(Nov.
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2014),
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228. LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 1.
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rather than create a broad and self-fulfilling CID.235 Further, the court
implicitly suggested that entities that are not themselves alleged to be
conducting deceptive and abusive practices with respect to consumer
financial laws should be afforded more deference when they assert factbased arguments disputing the germaneness of the issued CID.236 These
solutions correctly balance the CFPB’s interest in narrowing the
information gap between itself and its targets “who can best give [the
information] and who are most interested in not doing so,”237 with the
recipients’ interest in avoiding costly “fishing expeditions.”238
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